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John Stuart 
Mill: Freedom of 
expression and harm 
in the ‘post-truth’ era
This paper contends that John Stuart Mill’s 
arguments for freedom of expression – despite 
being first published in 1859 – remain a pow-
erful framework through which contempo-
rary issues of free speech can be explored and 
taught. As part of an analysis of Mill’s On liber-
ty, the notion of intolerance being the default 
condition of mankind and restrictions on free 
speech being a trans-generational wrong are 
delineated. The issue of on-campus censorship 
is discussed, as are the prominence and causes 
of self-censorship in both the media and wider 
society. The usefulness of Mill’s On liberty as a 
means of exploring these contemporary prob-
lems of free speech is expounded, particularly 
the enduring usefulness of his Harm Principle, 
and a phenomenon that is called the Paradox 
of Liberal Inheritance is identified. The concept 
of alethic disruption is developed to investi-
gate the emergence of ‘post-truth’ news, and 
a Mill-inspired response to this is outlined. It 
is argued that Mill articulates principles that 
modern media students can use as an acces-
sible means of approaching questions of media 
ethics, and that On liberty also makes power-
ful points about the etiquette of intellectual 
debate.
Keywords: John Stuart Mill, freedom of expres-
sion, harm, ‘post-truth’ era
Introduction: Freedom of expression – old 
questions, new questions
What are the limits of freedom of expression 
in a democracy? Is there even a limit? If there 
is one, who polices it – the legal system, public 
opinion or a hybrid of the two? Are either con-
sequentialism or deontology adequate ethical 
frameworks through which to produce coher-
ent answers to issues about free expression? 
Tom Bradshaw Since Milton’s 17th century plea for unlicensed 
publication, Areopagitica, the first three of 
these questions have been defining ones for 
the West (Berlin 2012, Cohen-Almagor 2005, 
O’Rourke 2003). And the importance of all 
four questions has been underscored by inci-
dents in both newsrooms and the corridors of 
power during the opening years of the new 
millennium. The death threats and killings that 
followed the publication of cartoons of the 
Prophet Mohammed in the Danish newspaper, 
Jyllands-Posten (2005-2006) and the French 
satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo (2015), illus-
trate that freedom of expression is not just a 
matter for the debating chamber, but is poten-
tially a matter of life and death to members of 
the media and wider society (Rose 2006).
Elsewhere, the prospect of state-backed press 
regulation in the UK arising from the Leveson 
Inquiry (2011-2012) prompted vociferous oppo-
sition from the mainstream media, who have 
argued that such a move is tantamount to pull-
ing away a pillar of open society that has been 
steadily buttressed since Milton’s 17th century 
essay (Nelson 2016). Yet freedom of speech is 
far from being an absolute right in the UK and 
is limited by laws of defamation and contempt 
and, until as recently as 2008, blasphemy. More-
over, as Frost (2016) explains, a range of legis-
lation has a restrictive effect on what can be 
broadcast or published in the UK on grounds 
of offence, from the Obscene Publications Acts 
1959 and 1964 to the Race Relations Act 1976 
and the Communications Act 2003. The free 
speech ramifications of such legislation are con-
tentious – both for the media and wider soci-
ety – as illustrated by the variety of mainstream 
polemics about freedom of expression (Garton 
Ash 2016, Hume 2015).
Long-established questions about the boundar-
ies of free speech, therefore, remain prevalent. 
But to these questions can be added another 
layer of complexity. This complexity is provid-
ed by what can be termed the alethic disrup-
tion within the emerging media ecosystems of 
the 21st century that are dominated by social 
media and the algorithms that power the con-
tent distribution on those social media plat-
forms (Knight 2013, Smith 2016). It has been 
contended by the new editor of the Guardian 
that in a ‘post-truth’ culture propelled by social 
media, the currency of online information is no 
longer truth but virality (Viner 2016). Audience 
engagement (by which is meant high unique 
visitor numbers and the sharing of content) 
becomes the altar on which ‘good’ journalism 
is potentially sacrificed. On this understanding, 
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what engages people online and prompts them 
to consume and share content is not its verac-
ity but its ‘affective’ – or emotional – power 
(Hermida 2016). This leads to the propagation 
– unwittingly, but sometimes wittingly – of mis-
information in an era in which ‘facts become 
secondary to feeling; expertise and vision to 
ersatz emotional connection’ (Smith 2016). 
Truth is in some instances relegated to being 
an optional extra. The prevalence and traction 
of ‘fake news’ in the coverage of the 2016 US 
Presidential election and the Brexit referen-
dum is cited as an example of truth’s relega-
tion (Hermida 2016, Viner 2016). Reflecting on 
the US Presidential election, Hermida describes 
how Donald Trump’s supporters ‘became the 
media themselves, spreading and amplifying 
subjective and emotional affective news – news 
designed to provoke passion, not inform’. This 
is ‘affective news’, a diet of content that is 
‘designed to stir up passions, feed prejudices 
and polarise publics’. Moreover,
People will share false information if it fits 
their view of the world. Even if some don’t 
quite believe it, they will share an article 
with the aim of entertaining, exciting or 
enraging friends and acquaintances. Fake 
news spreads so fast that potentially hun-
dreds of thousands of people could have 
seen it by the time it gets debunked (Her-
mida 2016).
The growth of ‘fake news’ and how to stem its 
flow – or at least nullify its penetration – has 
become a central concern for world leaders as 
well as social media company executives, with 
the integrity of democracy itself potentially 
being in jeopardy (Yuhas 2016).
The concept of alethic disruption is not equiv-
alent to the concept of ‘post-truth’, but the 
post-truth milieu should instead be regarded as 
the most recent and vivid illustration of alethic 
disruption. Alethic disruption is the wider phe-
nomenon of the networked society’s increas-
ingly strained and complex relationship with 
social reality and how the truth of that real-
ity is to be mediated, grasped and verified in 
a multimedia world. Churnalism (Davies 2008) 
is another manifestation of alethic disruption. 
Churnalism – the passive, desk-bound regur-
gitation of content by journalists from press 
releases or rival media – has particularly affect-
ed newsrooms and social media channels and, 
as a consequence, those platforms’ audiences. 
Churnalism and the emergence of post-truth 
fake news illustrate the evolution of alethic dis-
ruption.
What implication does the most recent aspect 
of alethic disruption, the post-truth milieu, 
have for freedom of expression? Many of the 
traditional arguments for unfettered – or at 
least largely unfettered – free expression have 
been developed on the basis that the free flow 
of debate enables truth to emerge (Milton 1973 
[1644], Mill 1989). This was the thought moti-
vating one of the most memorable figures of 
speech in Areopagitica:
And though all the winds of doctrine were 
let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be 
in the field, we do injuriously by licensing 
and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. 
Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever 
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and 
open encounter (ibid: 35).
But if the evolution of alethic disruption means 
that the emergence of truth is no longer of 
primary importance to a proportion of online 
audiences then where does that leave those old 
arguments upon which free speech has been 
founded? Is such a Miltonic argument just a 
quaint relic from the era of the quill that is ren-
dered redundant by the age of the meme?
There is a further element that complicates 
the contemporary debate around freedom of 
expression. This is the issue of censorship and 
self-censorship in the very places where free-
dom of thought is – or is often assumed to be 
– sine qua non: universities. In November 2016, 
the students’ union at City University London – 
a university with one of the most distinguished 
schools of journalism in the UK – voted in favour 
of a campus ban on the Sun, Daily Mail and 
Daily Express. The motion, ‘Opposing fascism 
and social divisiveness in the UK media’, stated 
that the ban could be extended to other media 
outlets and that the three specified titles were 
‘merely used as high-profile examples’ (Sweney 
and Jackson 2016). In passing the motion, City 
was the latest UK students’ union to approve a 
campus-ban on national press titles.
Online magazine Spiked has ranked universities 
on the basis of their restrictions on free speech, 
awarding each university a ‘red’, ‘amber’ or 
‘green’ status depending on the policies and 
actions of both students’ unions and univer-
sity administrators (Slater 2016). The 2016 sur-
vey had a sample of 115 universities. While a 
green rating is conferred on institutions which 
place no restrictions on lawful free speech, a 
red rating is for those universities which are 
‘hostile’ to freedom of expression by mandat-
ing ‘explicit restrictions on speech, including, 
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but not limited to, bans on specific ideologies, 
political affiliations, beliefs, books, speakers or 
words’ (ibid.). The amber rating is for an institu-
tion which ‘chills free speech and free expres-
sion by issuing guidance with regard to appro-
priate speech and conduct’ (ibid.). The 2016 
Free Speech University Rankings (FSUR) refers 
to an ‘epidemic of campus censorship’. Ninety 
per cent of institutions were given either a red 
(55 per cent) or amber (35 per cent) grading for 
2016, an increase of 10 per cent on 2015. Thirty 
students’ unions have banned newspapers, 25 
have banned songs, 20 have banned societies, 
and 19 have banned speakers or events. The 
coordinator of Spike’s rankings, Tom Slater, 
argues that such policies are inimical to univer-
sities’ quest for discovering the truth. ‘Today, in 
a time when campus bureaucrats see students 
as too vulnerable – or too easily led – to listen 
to difficult ideas, the entire purpose of the 
academy is being undermined, and the bar for 
censorship is only getting lower’ (Slater quoted 
in Ali 2016).
While Spiked’s language is arguably unhelpful-
ly sensationalist – references to an ‘epidemic’ 
and ‘campus bureaucrats’ is redolent of tab-
loidisation – it is the case that a new lexicon 
now frames the debate over freedom of expres-
sion in universities. ‘Safe space’, ‘trigger warn-
ing’ and ‘no platforming’ are terms frequently 
used by universities to justify restrictions on 
the expression of controversial views or con-
tent. And they have led to claims that current 
students, as part of ‘Generation Snowflake’ 
(Fox 2016), are being cosseted and deprived 
of robust intellectual development (Bromwich 
2016, Scruton 2016). The debate around this 
issue has also reached mainstream literary cul-
ture. A notable example is a novel by a Booker 
Prize-winning author which adopts the conceit 
of having as a narrator an unborn child with 
a satirical tongue. On the education he can 
expect, the foetus-narrator writes:
I’ll be an activist of the emotions, a loud, 
campaigning spirit fighting with tears and 
sighs to shape institutions around my vul-
nerable self. My identity will by my pre-
cious, my only true possession, my access to 
the only truth. The world must love, nourish 
and protect it as I do. If my college does not 
bless me, validate me and give me what I 
clearly need, I’ll press my face into the vice 
chancellor’s lapels and weep. Then demand 
his resignation (McEwan 2016: 146).
Social commentators have echoed the perspec-
tive of McEwan’s foetus, criticising the safe 
spaces and trigger warnings of the modern uni-
versity campus as a form of intellectual sabo-
tage. A vigorous case is presented by Scruton, 
who argues that open, Western society is itself 
being undermined by what he perceives to be 
on-campus censorship.
Those who wish to maintain the student 
mind in a condition of coddled vulnerabil-
ity, unhardened by opposition and unprac-
tised in argument, now police the campus, 
with the result that these places which 
should have been the last bastion of reason 
in a muddled world, are instead the places 
where all the muddles come home for nour-
ishment. The example vividly illustrates the 
way in which the attacks on free speech can 
go so far as to close off the route to knowl-
edge. And in the end that is why we should 
value this freedom, and why John Stuart 
Mill was so right to defend it as fundamen-
tal to a free society. Without it we will never 
really know what we think (Scruton 2016).
Scruton’s reference to J. S. Mill at the end of the 
passage suggests the enduring power of Mill 
to inform debates around freedom of expres-
sion. This paper is focused on extending this 
idea by exploring in detail the manifold ways 
in which Mill’s ideas, particularly those from 
On liberty, can be used as a trenchant means of 
analysing contemporary issues of free speech, 
even though On liberty was first published in 
1859. As argued above, an up-to-date discus-
sion of the boundaries of freedom of expres-
sion needs to acknowledge and incorporate 
both the issues posed by alethic disruption and 
contemporary manifestations of censorship in 
Western society, one species of which is the cli-
mate of on-campus restriction. This paper uses 
Mill as a prism through which to explore the 
on-going debates about offence and harm, and 
proposes what is called the Paradox of Liberal 
Inheritance. This paradox is focused on explor-
ing how many of the beneficiaries of Mill’s 
powerful vision of a liberal, tolerant society 
in which people are free to pursue what he 
termed ‘new and original experiments in living’ 
(1989: 81) are now attempting to stifle the very 
freedom of expression that is a precondition of 
such a tolerant society. In addition, the paper 
will explain why the study of Mill’s ideas is vital 
for modern students of journalism and media 
ethics. It is argued that Mill is a powerful lens 
through which tomorrow’s custodians of the 
flow of information can consider the limits of 
freedom of expression and media regulation.
The paper also proposes a potential solution 
to the issues of misinformation arising from 
alethic disruption, arguing with Jarvis (2016a, 
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2016b) that the appropriate response by both 
the media and regulators is not to attempt to 
shut down the various channels of (mis)infor-
mation but rather to target those same chan-
nels with truth. This, it is argued, is a Millian 
response that is firmly entrenched in the tradi-
tion of English liberal thought. To rephrase it in 
a Miltonic idiom, such a response to the rising 
tide of fake news and post-truth content is to 
enable ‘Truth to be in the field’ so it at least 
has a fighting chance to put falsehood ‘to the 
worse, in a free and open encounter’.
On On liberty
As a founding credo of modern liberal thought, 
On liberty has been – and continues to be 
– the focus of debate and re-interpretation 
(Berlin 2012, Cohen-Almagor 2005, Gray 2012, 
O’Rourke 2003, Rees 2012, Ryan 2012, Steel 
2012). While this paper is not the place to con-
trast and evaluate all these interpretations, it 
is worth expanding on two points, neither of 
which has arguably received enough attention 
in the secondary literature. The first is that Mill 
argues that intolerance – and by implication 
censored speech – is the default condition of 
human societies. The second is that restricting 
free speech is what can be termed a trans-gen-
erational wrong, affecting not just the present 
generation but posterity too.
On liberty is an ardent plea for the individual 
to be free from constraints imposed by both 
the state and by majority opinion, where those 
constraints go beyond restricting behaviour 
that causes harm to other people. Freedom of 
expression is one facet of this wider freedom 
that Mill regards as so vital for people to flour-
ish, both individually and collectively. But Mill 
does not contend that humankind has a benign 
nature, if only it were allowed to be free. 
Indeed, on occasion Mill’s statements regard-
ing human nature possess an almost Hobbesian 
tone, as when he claims that ‘the disposition 
of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-
citizens, to impose their own opinions and 
inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is 
so energetically supported by some of the best 
and by some of the worst feelings incident to 
human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under 
restraint by anything but want of power’ (1989: 
17).
Tolerance, moreover, does not come easy to 
humans, ‘so natural to mankind is intolerance 
in whatever they really care about’ (ibid: 11). 
The emergence of toleration is for Mill, there-
fore, a central element to the emergence of 
civilisation. As such, a society which acknowl-
edges the legitimacy of his Harm Principle 
– that ‘the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others’ (Mill 1989: 13) – is one 
where the thirst for power is overcome, or at 
least contained. Freedom of expression is thus 
an unnatural position; acknowledging the right 
for another person to say something that is 
repellent or hateful to me, or which I believe to 
be plain wrong, is something that goes against 
the grain of human nature. And for that rea-
son, once achieved, the acknowledgment is all 
the more precious. Another way of phrasing it 
is to say, as Bromwich does, that free speech 
is an ‘aberration’ and that ‘In most societies 
throughout history and in all societies some 
of the time, censorship has been the means 
by which a ruling group or a visible major-
ity cleanses the channels of communication to 
ensure that certain conventional practices will 
go on operating undisturbed’ (Bromwich 2016). 
For Mill, convention is a deadening, creativity-
sapping burden – referred to him in one place 
as the ‘despotism of custom’ (Mill 1989: 70) – 
and freedom of expression is a means of weak-
ening its influence.
A restriction on freedom of speech does not 
simply create an absence of opinion; it is an act 
of intellectual deprivation. Mill argues that it is 
a restriction on the spread of intellectual capi-
tal that can deprive subsequent generations. 
As such, it can be termed a trans-generation-
al wrong. In an attempt to convey his point 
with as much rhetorical force as possible, Mill 
invokes imagery of physical violence, describing 
censorship as a robbery afflicting not just the 
present generation but also future ones.
The peculiar evil of silencing the expression 
of an opinion is that it is robbing the human 
race, posterity as well as the existing gener-
ation, those who dissent from the opinion, 
still more those who hold it. If the opinion is 
right, they are deprived of the opportunity 
for exchanging error for truth: if wrong, 
they lose what is almost as great a benefit, 
the clearer perception and livelier impres-
sion of truth, produced by its collision with 
error (Mill 1989: 20).
Mill’s commitment to free speech stems from 
a broader commitment to diversity – diver-
sity of belief, diversity of lifestyle, diversity of 
thought – which is connected to his belief that 
diversity enables individuals to flourish, which 
in turn enables individuals to achieve a state of 
happiness (or as Mill, reflecting his utilitarian 
Tom Bradshaw
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background, often refers to it, utility). As com-
mentators have noted, an underlying theme of 
On liberty is how diversity is essential to prog-
ress (Collini 1989: xiv). This animating sprit of 
the essay – and of Mill’s thinking in general – is 
powerfully captured by Berlin:
What he [Mill] came to value most was … 
diversity, versatility, fullness of life – the 
unaccountable leap of individual genius, 
the spontaneity and uniqueness of a man, 
a group, a civilization. What he hated and 
feared was narrowness, uniformity, the 
crippling effect of persecution, the crushing 
of individuals by the weight of authority or 
of customs or of public opinion (2012: 134).
It is the dissident and heretic, therefore, who 
need protecting. For Mill, society has a duty 
to enable those who hold minority opinions 
to feel they can express them without fear of 
being silenced.
Self-censorship and the ‘spiral of silence’
Before exploring in detail how Mill’s ideas in 
On liberty can illuminate contemporary issues 
of freedom of expression, it is important to 
acknowledge another important aspect of con-
temporary communication in the West, which 
is the extent and nature of self-censorship in 
the social media-driven era. There is a signifi-
cant corpus of evidence to suggest that self-
censorship is prevalent among both the news 
media (Preston 2009, Rose 2006, Sefiha 2010, 
Sturges 2008) and the public more generally 
(Dans 2014, Das and Kramer 2013, Hampton et 
al 2014). This is, perhaps, in some ways counter-
intuitive, because self-censorship would seem 
to be an activity at odds with the click-happy 
culture of ‘over-sharing’ that some believe is 
characteristic of digital-native social media 
users (Bromwich 2016). However, self-censor-
ship and over-sharing are arguably two sides of 
the same coin, both being techniques relating 
to the development by social media users of an 
online persona.
But why be so concerned by self-censorship, a 
slippery phenomenon which, by definition, is 
difficult to quantify because its defining charac-
teristic is an absence – namely, silence? Self-cen-
sorship is important from a Millian perspective 
because, for Mill, the muzzling of one’s own 
opinion – whether through fear of upsetting 
conventional or majority opinion, or through 
fear of provoking a response from the state – 
is an evil, in so far as it inhibits the spread of 
ideas and inhibits diverse opinion (and thereby 
diversity itself). For Mill, freedom of thought 
and freedom of speech/expression are intel-
lectually indivisible; inhibit one and you inhibit 
both (1989: 17). As such, self-censorship – and 
the reasons that cause it to happen – are anoth-
er means by which the intellectual life of pres-
ent and future society is impoverished. Sturges 
(2008) offers a quadripartite taxonomy of the 
reasons for self-censorship, the first of which 
– the fear of breaking the ‘constraints of con-
formity’ – is phrased in distinctly Millian terms, 
invoking as it does the spectre of the tyranny of 
majority opinion.
Self-censorship is defined by Sedler as ‘the deci-
sion by an individual or group to refrain from 
speaking and the decision by a media organi-
zation to refrain from publishing information’ 
(2012). While a useful starting point, this is too 
narrow a definition. It is not just ‘speaking’ 
that individuals refrain from, but publishing 
social media updates, while media organisa-
tions might refrain from broadcasting as well 
as ‘publishing’. Writing from a US perspective, 
Sedler regards self-censorship as compromising 
the values of the First Amendment due to it 
being a phenomenon that inhibits the dissemi-
nation of information or ideas to the public.
However, one response to this is to argue that 
most instances of self-censorship in the social 
media age are something less concerning – they 
are merely a form of self-defence that prevent 
one’s remarks being misconstrued. This is in the 
position of Dans who, reflecting on his own 
use of Twitter, says that his behaviour on the 
platform was very different when he had 200 
followers to when he had tens of thousands 
– and that the explanation for the difference 
is ‘simply one of survival’ (2014). He contends 
that self-censorship is inherent in the way social 
media functions.
Anybody who has spent time sharing infor-
mation on a social network understands the 
dynamic, and that self-censorship is alive 
and well: as one’s perceived or real audi-
ence grows, the amount of information 
about ourselves that we are prepared to 
share diminishes. … The fewer people I am 
talking to, and the better I know them, the 
less I have to explain myself in detail, just to 
make sure there is no chance of any misun-
derstanding (ibid).
The autoethnographic, qualitative nature of 
Dans’s reflections on the nature of self-censor-
ship on social media contrasts with the quanti-
tative data gathered by Das and Kramer (2013). 
Through data provided by Facebook, and gath-
ered from 3.9 million users over a 17-day peri-
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od, their study attempts to capture the extent 
to which users of Facebook self-censor at the 
‘last minute’ (2013: 120). Their study defines 
self-censorship in this social media environment 
as the failure to post a status update that has 
been drafted. However, this is a questionable 
definition, as a user might opt not to post an 
update for a host of reasons other than self-
censorship – such as lack of time, the realisation 
of multiple mistakes of grammar or spelling etc. 
However, in a similar manner to Dans’s notion 
of self-censorship being a means of digital ‘sur-
vival’, Das and Kramer introduce the concept 
of how self-censorship on social media can pre-
serve a user’s ‘social capital’ by not alienating 
their online friends, or at least a subset of them.
As Hampton et al discuss, the hope of some 
social media pioneers was that the proliferation 
of digital platforms would open the channels of 
communication so that those holding minority 
views would be willing to voice their opinions, 
in a way that they had not been in the pre-
internet era due to the ‘spiral of silence’ phe-
nomenon (2014). The spiral of silence tendency 
refers to people’s reluctance to publicly air their 
views on policy issues when they think their 
view is a minority opinion. However, research 
by the Pew Center in the United States has pro-
vided evidence that the internet has achieved 
no such thing. The research, which consisted of 
a survey of more than 1,800 adults, concluded 
that the growth of social media platforms had 
not reduced the spiral of silence tendency and 
that people are less willing to discuss policy 
issues on social media than they are in person. 
Moreover, in both face-to-face and digital set-
tings, people are more prepared to share their 
views if they believe their audience will be in 
agreement (ibid.).
It is important to make the distinction between 
censorship of facts and censorship of opinions. 
Research into the extent of self-censorship 
among the general public can implicitly focus 
on self-censorship of opinion (Das and Kramer 
2013; Hampton et al 2014), while research into 
self-censorship by the media often – again 
implicitly – focuses on self-censorship of facts 
(Preston 2009, Sefiha 2010), although not 
always (Rose 2006, Sturges 2008). But what 
constitutes the greater wrong – censorship or 
self-censorship? Sturges is unequivocal. He con-
tends that self-censorship is ‘much more insidi-
ous’ because ‘if others suppress our freedom of 
expression it is bad, but if we allow ourselves to 
censor our own opinions it is worse’ (2008: 256). 
Such a position is implicit in the argument of 
Flemming Rose, culture editor of Danish news-
paper Jyllands-Posten, who oversaw the publi-
cation of the cartoons of the Prophet Moham-
med that resulted in death threats. Explaining 
his reasoning behind the publication of the 
contentious cartoons he wrote:
I commissioned the cartoons in response 
to several incidents of self-censorship in 
Europe caused by widening fears and feel-
ings of intimidation in dealing with issues 
related to Islam. ... Our goal was simply to 
push back self-imposed limits on expression 
that seemed to be closing in tighter (Rose 
2006).
The notion of resisting ‘self-imposed’ limits in 
order to express a view is in the Millian tradi-
tion. Biting one’s tongue for the sake of ‘sur-
vival’ (Dans 2014) or in order to foster ‘social 
capital’ (Das and Kramer 2013) would be anath-
ema to Mill. While arguments in On liberty sug-
gest that he would probably regard a phenom-
enon such as the spiral of silence as a naturally 
occurring one given humankind’s innate intol-
erance (Mill 1989: 17), he would not regard it as 
inevitable but, instead, a symptom of the fact 
that the roots of tolerance in society were not 
extending deeply enough. Contemporary man-
ifestations of censorship and self-censorship, 
and the appropriate response to them, are thus 
potentially amenable to a Mill-inspired analysis. 
This paper now turns to the most powerful con-
cept that Mill offers those who seek to under-
stand current issues of free expression.
The Harm Principle revisited
Mill’s position on freedom of expression flows 
from what has become known as his Harm Prin-
ciple, a deceptively simple ethical proposition 
which has generated much debate regarding 
its practical application. The principle states 
that ‘The only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others’ (Mill 1989: 13). Mill makes 
this statement because of an absolute commit-
ment to self-determination, in so far as that 
autonomy does not harmfully affect others. 
‘Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign’ (ibid).
Since the essay was first published, critics have 
claimed that it is bogus to suggest there is a 
workable distinction between actions that 
affect only the individual agent and actions 
that affect others. The history of this line of 
argument is well-documented by Rees (2012), 
who quotes a leading article from The Times 
Literary Supplement of 10 July 1948:
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The greater part of English history since his 
[Mill’s] day has been a practical commentary 
on the fallacy of this distinction. No action, 
however intimate, is free from social conse-
quence. No human being can say that what 
he is, still less what he does, affects no one 
but himself (Rees 2012: 171-172).
Whether or not the distinction between purely 
private actions or other-regarding actions can 
be soundly drawn is a question that goes to the 
heart of debates about liberal versus conserva-
tive approaches to social policy. But the distinc-
tion does have a plausibility to it, a plausibility 
which Mill helps establish by differentiating 
between ‘definite’ damage and ‘contingent’ 
damage. No man should be punished for sim-
ply being drunk, he argues, but a policeman, 
for example, should face legal and social sanc-
tion for being drunk on duty because there is ‘a 
definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, 
either to an individual or to the public’ (1989: 
82). But where there is ‘contingent’ injury, 
by which Mill means behaviour that does not 
breach a specific public duty or cause hurt to 
anyone but himself, ‘the inconvenience is one 
which society can afford to bear, for the sake 
of the greater good of human freedom’ (ibid).
‘Damage’ here is being used as a synonym for 
‘harm’, and in providing an analysis of contem-
porary issues relating to freedom of expres-
sion it is vital there is lexical precision. The key 
distinction that needs to be drawn is between 
‘harm’ (or ‘damage’) and ‘offence’, and it has 
been argued that another important distinc-
tion is that between freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press. Cammaerts (2015) con-
tends that the two freedoms are not equiva-
lent, with freedom of the press arguably car-
rying a greater burden of social responsibility 
than the former. He further argues that free-
dom of expression ‘is not necessarily a prima-
ry right in all circumstances, it has to be bal-
anced out with other rights and protections, 
for example the right not to be discriminated 
against, the right not to be racially abused’ and 
uses the concept ‘Intricate Freedom’ to capture 
the complexity surrounding free expression 
(ibid). It is a contention of this paper that, while 
freedom of expression is indeed intricate in this 
way, a Mill-inspired delineation of the distinc-
tions between offence and harm continues to 
provide a useful frame through which to disen-
tangle debates around freedom of expression.
Frost describes the issue of harm and offence as 
one of ‘constant controversy’, contending that 
freedom of expression ‘must include the right 
to offend, but does it include the right to harm, 
and when does offence turn to harm?’ (Frost 
2016: 198). Underpinning Frost’s question is 
the issue of how exactly we define ‘harm’. But 
despite the clear need for precision in drawing 
distinctions between harm and offence, the line 
between the two concepts still often appears 
blurred. For example, in a recent study of how 
members of the public understand offence (Das 
and Graefer 2016) the authors write:
On the one hand are those who champion 
free speech, who argue that we all have the 
right (some say, the duty) to express some-
times unpopular opinions without fear of 
censure. On the other are those who say 
that with that right comes a responsibility 
not to needlessly offend. For many who 
take this latter viewpoint, mocking religious 
symbols of two religions equally may seem 
equivalent on paper. But if one of those 
religions links to a culture, and very often 
an ethnicity, that already faces widespread 
discrimination and hardship, then perhaps 
free speech has crossed the line into offen-
siveness (ibid).
The use of the word ‘offensiveness’ here is con-
fused with ‘harm’ or ‘harmfulness’. Free speech 
does not ‘cross a line’ into offensiveness; offen-
siveness is part of the sphere in which free 
speech is deployed – the ability to say things 
that offend is what makes speech ‘free’. The 
line that should be avoided being crossed is 
the line into harmfulness. Das and Graefer 
later acknowledge this when they write that 
‘the umbrella of “harmful and offensive mate-
rial” needs more nuanced, focused and critical 
research’ (2016). But where does the distinction 
between the two lie, and what sort of harm is it 
that justifies restriction on free expression? Mill 
adopts a hard line on this point.
Steel believes Mill sets a high threshold for the 
circumstances in which the state can legitimate-
ly restrict freedom of speech. This is because, on 
his reading, harm is understood by Mill to mean 
a physical hurt; perceived emotional or mental 
‘harm’ are not sufficient to justify restriction.
For Mill, these circumstances are those in 
which life and liberty come under an immi-
nent threat of harm. … Harm here … is 
understood as physical assault or at least 
the threat of assault on a person or proper-
ty. As such for Mill, the limits of freedom of 
speech are very specific indeed (Steel 2012: 
22).
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Collini, too, sets the threshold high, summaris-
ing Mill’s position as being one where the only 
legitimate ground for restricting a person’s 
activities is that they ‘are likely to produce 
definite harm to some identifiable other per-
son or persons’ (Collini 1989, xiv, my empha-
sis). The adjectives ‘definite’ and ‘identifiable’ 
are important here. On Collini’s reading of the 
Harm Principle, vague notions of possible harm 
being caused to some potential group or other 
are not acceptable to justify state interference 
in individual behaviour. The harm needs to be 
clear and specific. Mill’s principle might not 
always allow immediate, definite conclusions to 
be drawn about the rightness or wrongness of 
societal interference over individual behaviour. 
But Mill’s point is that the onus of proof for the 
occurrence of harm lies with the institution or 
person proposing the restriction (ibid: xvii).
Mill’s arguments here relating to harm and 
freedom of expression are not conclusive for 
the simple reason that what should be meant 
by ‘harm’ can be – and is – contested, for all the 
attempts at lexical precision. Cohen-Almagor 
believes Mill deals with the limits of free speech 
in a ‘hasty’ manner, claiming that, like other 
philosophers in the liberal tradition, including 
Milton, Dewey and Rawls, he wants to focus on 
‘principles, not the exceptions to them’ (2005: 
15-16), while Berlin alleges that ‘rigour in argu-
ment is not among his [Mill’s] accomplishments’ 
(2012: 145). However, even Mill’s critics, such as 
Cohen-Almagor, who argue that hurt should 
in some cases encompass emotional impact 
(or ‘offense to sensibilities’), frame their posi-
tion in Millian terms, as when Cohen-Almagor 
states that ‘generally speaking – there is a need 
to strike a balance between the right to free-
dom of expression and harms that result from 
a certain speech. It is argued that the right to 
exercise free expression does not include the 
right to do unjustifiable harm to others’ (2005: 
6). Despite ‘harm’ and ‘offence’ remaining 
contested terms, it remains the case that Mill 
frames the debate with clarity.
‘Experiments in living’ and the Paradox of Lib-
eral Inheritance
Through On liberty’s espousal of diversity, tol-
eration and support of dissenting voices, Mill 
produced arguably the most powerful credo 
of modern liberal thinking (Berlin 2012; Collini 
1989). This credo helped set the intellectual and 
social climate that has since enabled previously 
oppressed groups – women, LBGT people and 
people from black and ethnic minorities – to 
benefit from both progressive legislation and 
changing social views; it is no coincidence that 
Mill, eight years after the publication of On lib-
erty, proposed an (unsuccessful) amendment to 
the Reform Bill that would have extended the 
franchise to women (Collini 1989: xxviii). Mill, 
as the arch-proponent of the right to dissent, 
is committed to the right for people to conduct 
their ‘experiments in living’ provided those 
experiments do not harm others.
Yet some of the beneficiaries of Mill’s intellec-
tual inheritance – universities and their unions 
– now seek to stifle some of the central tenets 
of On liberty. This is the Paradox of Liberal 
Inheritance. The City University students’ union 
motion discussed above, and the no-platform-
ing of controversial speakers at universities, is 
not only contrary to the spirit of On liberty but 
in outright contradiction. ‘If all mankind minus 
one, were of one opinion, and only one person 
were of the contrary opinion, mankind would 
be no more justified in silencing that one per-
son, than he, if he had the power, would be 
justified in silencing mankind’ (Mill 1989: 20). 
This is a statement by Mill, the arch-liberal. 
But how many professed liberals would con-
cur with the statement now? Is it, as Bromwich 
suggests (2016), too liberal a sentiment for con-
temporary liberals to swallow? This points to 
the radical nature of On liberty, a radicalness 
that is sometimes overlooked. Mill is opposed 
to tyranny in all its forms: the tyranny of the 
state and the tyranny of the law, but also the 
tyranny of public opinion. From the following 
passage, it is more than tempting to think that 
Mill would view the modern campus as a form 
of tyranny.
Protection, therefore, against the tyran-
ny of the magistrate is not enough: there 
needs protection also against the tyranny of 
the prevailing opinion and feeling; against 
the tendency of society to impose, by other 
means than civil penalties, its own ideas and 
practices as rules of conduct on those who 
dissent from them; to fetter the develop-
ment, and, if possible, prevent the forma-
tion, of any individuality not in harmony 
with its ways, and compel all characters to 
fashion themselves upon the model of its 
own (1989: 8).
Mill has a tonic – or perhaps, rather, a chal-
lenge – for the students’ union and the no-
platformers: if you cannot defend your position 
in the teeth of challenge and contradiction 
from those whose views you disagree with or 
even detest, then you do not know the grounds 
for your position. If you cannot stand up and 
defend your position then your belief is little 
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better than a superstition; an unsupported 
tenet drifting about in the intellectual ether. It 
is a prejudice, underpinned by no understand-
ing or rational basis. ‘There is the greatest dif-
ference between presuming an opinion to be 
true, because, with every opportunity for con-
testing it, it has not been refuted, and assum-
ing its truth for the purpose of not permitting 
its refutation’ (1989: 23). Mill, therefore, serves 
to provide an electric shock for debates about 
freedom of expression on campus. On liberty 
also challenges professed liberals to ponder 
what it truly means to be a liberal.
Why should media students study Mill?
Mill’s ideas can challenge thinking on campus 
in another way. Through his arguments about 
what constitutes harm, Mill is a powerful lens 
through which today’s media students – tomor-
row’s custodians of the flow of information – 
can debate the limits of freedom of expression 
and regulation, and as such a strong case can 
be made for his works being a cornerstone for 
classes on media ethics. On liberty is not the 
only work of Mill’s to consider in this regard. 
His Utilitarianism (Mill 2011 [1861]) and its 
refined version of the ‘greatest happiness of 
the greatest number’ principle (Gray 2012) is 
another work that provides an accessible ethi-
cal principle from which questions of media 
ethics can be approached.
There are two other reasons why it is impor-
tant to use Mill as a means of teaching eth-
ics to students. As a committed reformer and 
progressive, the starting point of Mill’s think-
ing in many ways chimes with the instinctive 
intellectual position of many students. Among 
other causes, Mill argued in favour of votes 
for women, for the right of public meeting in 
Hyde Park and for proportional representation 
(Berlin 2012: 137). Explaining this to students 
can serve to make Mill seem real and relevant 
– and therefore worth a listen. Moreover, Mill 
informs the etiquette and ethics of intellectual 
debate. Students have been accused of belong-
ing to ‘Generation Snowflake’ and of ‘melting’ 
at the slightest challenge to their opinions (Fox 
2016). But Mill presents powerful arguments 
for why opinions should be held up to ongoing 
and vigorous scrutiny, and these arguments can 
be used to emphasise the importance of lively 
debate in the classroom. Mill believes that it is 
necessary for even the most secure and sacro-
sanct beliefs to be held up to scrutiny, other-
wise the meaning of such doctrines becomes 
‘enfeebled’, and the risk is that ‘living beliefs’ 
become ‘dead dogma’ (1989: 37). ‘Both teach-
ers and learners go to sleep at their post, as 
soon as there is no enemy in the field’ (ibid: 44). 
Mill is also wary of how the call for ‘fair dis-
cussion’ is open to abuse by being used to shut 
down vigorous debate. This Millian point has 
arisen more recently with concerns that pleas 
for ‘civility’ in intellectual debate are potential-
ly tantamount to shutting down that debate 
(Bromwich 2016). Considering the proposition 
that there should be freedom of opinion on the 
condition that the delivery should ‘not pass the 
bounds of fair discussion’, Mill is cautious.
Much might be said on the importance of 
fixing where these supposed bounds are to 
be placed; for if the test be offence to those 
whose opinion is attacked, I think expe-
rience testifies that this offence is given 
whenever the attack is telling and power-
ful, and that every opponent who pushes 
them hard, and whom they find it difficult 
to answer, appears to them, if he shows any 
strong feeling on the subject, an intemper-
ate opponent (1989: 54).
As such, Mill has much to say about the tone 
of healthy debate as much as the content of 
healthy debate.
Mill and alethic disruption
Earlier, this paper identified and elaborated 
on two aspects to Mill’s thinking in On liberty. 
Firstly, the notion that stifling free expression 
is potentially a trans-generational wrong and, 
secondly, how intolerance – and therefore the 
restriction of free speech – is the default con-
dition of mankind. The paper also invoked the 
concept of alethic disruption to describe and 
account for the spread of ‘fake news’, affective 
news and misinformation. Having discussed the 
application of Mill’s arguments to issues of cen-
sorship and self-censorship, the paper now ends 
with a suggestion of how a Millian approach 
can be applied to the regulation of information 
in a ‘post-truth’ era. This argument builds on 
points made by Jarvis (2016a, 2016b).
As has been discussed, Mill sets a high threshold 
for what constitutes harm. If an action will cause 
a physical harm, or in all reasonable likelihood 
cause a physical harm, to a specific individual or 
group, then the action can be restricted on that 
basis. While some malicious items of fake news 
that equate to incitement might be restricted 
under this criterion, most would not. To censor 
such content could be to raise the spectre of a 
return to the ‘default condition of mankind’. 
Indeed, the presence of falsehood is sometimes 
welcomed by Mill as a means of jolting truth 
into life (Mill 1989: 44). But how should the 
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spread of bogus information and demagogu-
ery be countered? For Mill, the answer would 
be to pro-actively question the falsehoods; to 
demand that evidence and opinion be given to 
back them up. Vigorous questioning, after all, 
is how Mill believes we are able to keep alive 
‘a living truth’ rather than allowing such state-
ments to ossify into ‘dead dogma’ (ibid: 37).
A Millian approach would, therefore, be to take 
on the purveyors of misinformation in their 
own arena; to take to the social media plat-
forms with facts. As Jarvis puts it, the answer 
is to ‘flood the zone with good information’ 
(2016a) rather than seeking to censor what is 
misinformation. But to do this, journalists can 
no longer just produce content in traditional 
column inches or long-form articles on web 
pages, otherwise they – and their fact-checking 
endeavours – face irrelevance. Instead, tradi-
tional media ‘must adapt to their new reality 
and bring their journalism – their facts, fact-
checking, reporting, explanation and context 
– to the public where the public is, in a form 
and voice that is appropriate to the context and 
use of each platform’ (Jarvis 2016b). This means 
utilising memes, GIFs, video and other online 
techniques that engage social media users. Jar-
vis contends that it is impossible to play ‘Whac-
A-Mole’ with inaccurate information, by which 
he means scouring the web and trying to delete 
each and every piece of bogus content when it 
pops up.
Instead of mourning the creation of fake-
news memes and putting the onus on Face-
book to kill them… we should be pouring 
out our own truth memes – with facts, fact-
checking, context, explanation, education, 
reporting, watch-dogging: journalism, in 
short. We should be arming fair-minded, 
intelligent, curious, rational, fact-loving 
citizens … with the weapons, the truth bul-
lets, to fire at will in their conversations. 
They won’t win all the wars but they will 
win some fact battles alongside us if only 
we enable them (Jarvis 2016b).
Although Jarvis does not mention Mill in his 
argument it is, nonetheless, Millian with its 
emphasis on truth doing battle in an unrestrict-
ed market place of ideas. As such, it is another 
illustration of how Mill’s legacy continues to 
indirectly inform contemporary issues of free 
expression.
Conclusion
Despite writing in Victorian times, Mill outlines 
positions and arguments that modern academe 
can usefully ponder amid concerns over on-
campus censorship, and self-censorship more 
widely. This paper has suggested that, while 
contentious in its application in particular 
instances, the Harm Principle remains a pow-
erful starting point for contemporary debates 
about free expression. Moreover, it has been 
argued that Mill articulates principles that 
modern media students can use as an acces-
sible means of approaching questions of media 
ethics. He also makes powerful points about 
the etiquette of intellectual debate. In addi-
tion, it has been argued that Mill’s vision for 
a liberal society and the implications of that 
liberal creed on free expression pose challeng-
ing questions for those who currently profess to 
be liberals. Despite his arguments having been 
made more than a century-and-a-half ago, the 
paper has explored how Mill speaks engagingly 
to current debates over freedom of expression.
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